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ABSTRACT
Following the economic crisis in 2007–2008, many urban regeneration programmes
were replaced with forms of adaptive governance (e.g. slow urbanism). This paper maps
and analyses transformational eﬀects of such adaptive governance initiatives through
a case of neighbourhood restructuring. It studies whether adaptive governance institu-
tionalizes – i.e. transforms the existing governance system – and whether it materializes
in the built environment. It shows how the adaptive governance initiatives in this case
failed to diﬀuse and endure, and, therefore, the transformational eﬀect on both the
existing governance system and the area has been limited. The reasons for this are
discussed.
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Introduction
The governance concept has arisen from the need to deal with highly complex societal
issues, characterized by multiple actors, uncertain futures, and non-linear dynamics (e.g.
Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003; Duit and Galaz 2008; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004;
Teisman, van Buuren, and Gerrits 2009; Gerrits 2012). Social systems may be prone to
sudden radical shifts such as economic and ﬁnancial crises or major political and policy
changes (Gerrits 2008; Eppel 2012). As Duit and Galaz (2008) and Teisman, van Buuren,
and Gerrits (2009) argue, the occurrence of unpredictable and radical changes demands
ﬂexibility from politicians and policymakers alike. This ﬂexibility should not be limited
to individual responses but should include the routines and operations of the governance
system as a whole, including its institutions.
This thinking has given rise to the adaptive governance paradigm (e.g. Bovaird 2008;
Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003; Duit and Galaz 2008; Gerrits 2012; Meek and Marshall
2018), which has become established in the literatures on governance and public manage-
ment (see Chaﬃn, Gosnell, andCosens 2014; Huitema et al. 2009; Plummer, Armitage, and
de Loë 2013 for literature reviews). Its practical implications have been used in resource
management, ecosystemmanagement (Folke et al. 2005), climate change (Pahl-Wostl 2007;
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VanBuuren et al. 2015), and, increasingly, other sectors such as national security policy and
development aid (Brunner 2010). Its usefulness has also been acknowledged in the realm of
spatial governance (e.g. Heeg, Klagge, and Ossenbrügge 2003; Doak and Karadimitriou
2007; Ruth and Coelho 2007), on which this paper focuses. Under such diverse headings as
slow urbanism and organic area development, forms of adaptive governance have been
experimented with in order to engage with spatial restructuring and regeneration in highly
uncertain contexts characterized by dwindling public andprivate investment capacity,ﬁscal
restructuring, and housing crises.
Such approaches may result in some short-term eﬀects, but an important question
concerns the extent to which such attempts actually transform the governance system
and its institutions more profoundly so that the system can harness crises in a more
adaptive manner (Healey 2006; Mapfumo et al. 2015; Termeer, Dewulf, and Biesbroek
2016). Experiments in governance, such as adaptive governance, may encounter sig-
niﬁcant barriers that preclude systemic, transformational change (Healey 2006).
Transformational change refers to deep, structural, and enduring change to the existing
governance system and its institutions (Termeer, Dewulf, and Biesbroek 2016). Although
there has been some research (e.g. Plummer, Armitage, and de Loë 2013), there is not
much detailed knowledge about the wider and longer-term impact of adaptive govern-
ance on existing institutions. The literature on the transformational capacity of adaptive
governance is limited.1 Another gap in the literature concerns the eﬀect that adaptive
governance may have on the built environment, i.e. material eﬀects. Consequently, this
paper addresses the transformational capacity of adaptive governance, with a focus on
two aspects: (1) transformations in the existing governance system, which concern the
institutionalization of adaptive governance, and (2) spatial transformations, which
pertain to the spatial materialization of plans and proposals.
Scholars (e.g. Duit and Galaz 2008; Pierson 2000) have pointed to tensions in
pursuing durable transformations of institutions through adaptive governance. With
institutionalization and materialization, there is a chance of lock-in consequent to the
development of solidiﬁed institutions and highly durable physical structures (Gerrits and
Marks 2017). The ﬂexibility essential to adaptive governance may be inimical to materi-
alization and institutionalization (see Zijderveld 2000), raising the question of whether
adaptive governance can actually institutionalize and materialize without losing its core
features.
This paper endeavours to generate insight into the transformational power of adaptive
governance, taking into account both institutionalization and materialization. The
research question is as follows: what is the transformational eﬀect of adaptive govern-
ance on the governance system and the built environment, and what explains that
eﬀect?
This research question is addressed through a detailed qualitative case study on the
Zomerhof area in the Dutch city of Rotterdam.
Theoretical framework
Adaptive governance
In the context of swift and major changes, the eﬀectiveness of governance depends on its
capacity to respond ﬂexibly and use reversible strategies that can be adapted to new
circumstances, i.e. adaptive governance (e.g. Bovaird 2008; Teisman and Klijn 2008; Duit
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and Galaz 2008; Gerrits 2011, 2012). As Van Van Buuren et al. (2015, 1) put it ‘such an
adaptive approach enables actors to maintain or improve the viability of a system under
variable or changing conditions’ (see also Fankhauser, Smith, and Tol 1999). The
literature on adaptive governance emphasizes the need for ﬂexible approaches in
which actors continuously monitor their environment and optimize their response in
the face of ongoing changes (Huitema et al. 2009; Olsson et al. 2006; Plummer, Armitage,
and de Loë 2013). Learning is essential to the system’s ability to deal with new circum-
stances. Consequently, experimentation and pilots are important pillars of adaptive
governance (see Folke et al. 2005; Huntjens et al. 2012). According to Van Buuren
et al. (2015), ﬂexible governance arrangements are characterized by: (1) ﬂexibility in
decision-making processes that allows for speeding up and slowing down and for the
entry and exit of actors during the process; (2) substantive ﬂexibility with regard to scope,
time horizon, and goals; (3) organizational ﬂexibility.
There is a tension between, on the one hand, governance arrangements that promote
adaptive behaviour and, on the other hand, the formal and informal institutions that
prohibit continuous change in the way the government behaves (Duit and Galaz 2008;
Cox 2010). Proponents of adaptive governance may push for experimentation and swift
changes, but the institutional setting may hold them back in order to safeguard citizens
and enterprises from a whimsical government displaying maladaptive behaviour, as well
as to guard vested interests. The issue then is the extent to which those adaptive
approaches institutionalize.
Institutionalization
Institutions are deﬁned here as the formal and the informal rules inﬂuencing and
structuring behaviour (Giddens 1984; Ostrom 1990). Formal institutions refer to laws
and formal regulations, whereas informal institutions cover social norms, conventions,
codes, rituals, routines, and roles (Giddens 1984). Institutions have a stabilizing eﬀect
because they structure individuals’ behaviour and continue to exist over long periods
time (e.g. Zijderveld 2000). They provide stability and meaning to actors’ actions
(March and Olsen 1996; Scott 1995). Scott (1995) distinguishes three types of institu-
tions: (1) cognitive institutions, which pertain to images, visions, and cognitive frames;
(2) normative institutions such as norms and values, including mechanisms for
monitoring and sanctioning if certain norms are contravened; (3) regulative institu-
tions concerning formal rules and regulations. We use Scott’s typology to distinguish
diﬀerent kinds of institutions in the empirical research and make the empirical analysis
more ﬁne-grained.
Studying the function of institutions in governance, Koppenjan and Klijn (2004)
distinguish between institutions at the arena level and institutions at the interaction
level. Arena rules regulate the setting and determine the type of game that is played.
These rules relate to actors’ positions, rewards, and deﬁnitions of reality (problems and
solutions). They also determine who can change the rules. Interaction rules regulate
how players treat one another and which speciﬁc moves are allowed, as well as access
and interaction (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Rules about who is admitted to the
community are interaction rules. A rule that speciﬁes who makes the access rules is
an arena rule.
Scholars have posited that institutionalization involves the development of more or less
regular and ﬁxed patterns (Zijderveld 2000). According to Zijderveld, institutionalization
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refers to the solidifying of behavioural patterns into normative patterns with rule-like
qualities. Strong institutionalization may imply the ﬁxation and formalization of rules.
Here, we focus on two dimensions of institutionalization: the formation of institutions
and the stabilization of institutions (see also Duineveld, van Assche, and Beunen 2013).
The formation of an institution involves representing and acknowledging the institution
(for example by drawing on it) and deﬁning its boundaries (for example determining that
a contractual rule is valid for six years only). The stabilization of institutions involves sub-
processes of objectiﬁcation (constructing the institution as an objective truth that exists
independent of observation) and naturalization (positioning an institution as part of the
natural order of things) (Duineveld, van Assche, and Beunen 2013, 3). Institutions can
also destabilize and even de-form, i.e. de-institutionalization can occur.
Materialization
An important dimension of new governance approaches becoming transformational lies
in the relationship between the new approach and the built environment. Does the
adaptive governance approach transform a speciﬁc space physically by modifying mate-
rial objects? In spatial transformations such as in neighbourhoods, relevant types of
material objects include but are not limited to: buildings (e.g. repurposing an abandoned
warehouse), transportation infrastructure (e.g. altering a road’s capacity), other infra-
structure (e.g. adding water holding areas in order to deal with peak discharge), parks
(e.g. creating one in order to attract new residents), but also paper objects such as policy
reports, maps, and books. Duineveld, van Assche, and Beunen (2013) view the process of
materialization as a process of object formation and object stabilization. An important
element in object formation is reiﬁcation, i.e. representing and acknowledging an object
as a separate and distinguishable unit. For example, a cluster of trees and shrubs may be
acknowledged as a ‘park’. Object stabilization involves objectiﬁcation (socially construct-
ing objects as objective truths that exist independent of observation) and naturalization,
which means that the objects are considered part of the natural order of things. Through
objectiﬁcation and naturalization, objects become unquestioned, and theymove from the
ﬁctitious or aspired to the realm of reality. The development of a material reality is an
important dimension in the type of case – urban restructuring – considered in this paper.
The institutionalization and materialization of adaptive governance having been
discussed, the next section focuses on the point at which change in governance becomes
transformational.
Transformational change: deep, wide, and enduring change in institutions and
materials
Transformational change generally refers to ‘a major shift in characteristic features and
functions, resulting in a fundamentally new system or process’ (Mapfumo et al. 2015), i.e.
a qualitative change that causes a major discontinuity in the system under consideration,
as well as enduring change (Termeer, Dewulf, and Biesbroek 2016). Some literature
contrasts transformational change and incremental change, the latter involving decisions
that aim to ‘maintain the essence and integrity of an incumbent system’ (Park et al. 2012,
119). However, this position overlooks the fact that many incremental changes may
eventually result in a major change (Lindblom 1979; Termeer, Dewulf, and Biesbroek
2016). Lindblom (1979) argued that sequences of small changes may accomplish changes
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more quickly than radical attempts to change everything at once, simply because the
latter may arouse antagonisms.
A new governance approach has transformational eﬀects if it changes the institutional
and material realm deeply, widely, and enduringly. The existing literature does not deﬁne
the exact width of change required for it to be considered transformational. Any absolute
measure that would deﬁne a hard boundary between ‘wide’ and ‘limited’ change is contest-
able. This paper assumes a qualitative gamut from non-transformational to transforma-
tional change. In line with this study’s qualitative approach, we aim to unpack processes of
transformation in a qualitative way and elucidate the mechanisms through which trans-
formational eﬀects come into being.
Deep change
Deep change refers to the altering of assumptions underlying a particular system, including
values and logics. This contrasts with superﬁcial change, which modiﬁes existing practices
without changing their underlying logics and assumptions. In terms of institutional
transformation, this means that it is not only the institutions that regulate interactions
between actors that must have changed, but also the frames and rules that underlie the
interaction rules; the institutions at the arena level must have altered. Consequently, there
is a change in the rules that determine the ‘logic of the game’ and the deﬁnition of reality
(e.g. a frame that deﬁnes what is considered a problem or a solution).
A deep material change implies that the logic and values underlying material objects
change. This goes beyond introducing new material objects in a neighbourhood or
improving existing objects by renovating them. An adaptive governance approach has
transformational eﬀects in the material realm when materials become fundamentally
ﬂexible. For example, a street can function ﬂexibly as a road for cars or as a festival ground.
In addition, the existence of material objects becomes ﬂexible in the sense that objects can
be removed or dismantled, i.e. they are adapted to temporary use. Decomposable houses or
container houses serve as examples of this.
Wide change
Wide change has a broad scope rather than a narrow one that aims only at a limited
speciﬁc element within a system. Transformational change therefore covers large chunks
of a system. A broad scope may also refer to themulti-dimensionality of change ormulti-
level change. For adaptive governance to be transformational, the newly formed practices
that have formed and stabilized institutionally must spread or ‘travel’. Actors closely
involved in governance innovations may believe strongly in them and may have their
practices guided by them, but the new governance approach must be adopted in other
arenas, at other governance levels, and in other organizations (Healey 2006) for it to
become transformational. This means that the newly formed and stabilized institutions
‘[. . .] have to challenge and shift an array of already routinized governance processes,
with their complex mixture of conscious and taken-for-granted modes of practice. New
concepts have to “jump” boundaries and “break through” resistances, involving implicit
and explicit struggles’ (Healey 2006, 305). Following Healey, we argue that ‘episodes’ of
governance innovation need to resonate elsewhere in order to be seen as legitimate and to
endure and have transformational eﬀects.
Wide change in materials occurs when material objects travel or are widely repro-
duced, for example in a wide range of organizations. An example is the introduction of
the enduring ﬂexibility of street use elsewhere, on the basis of experiences with the
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original spatial project. Thus, temporarily usable material objects and adaptive func-
tions of material objects are introduced beyond the original project.
Enduring change
The third element of transformation is endurance. This implies that newly formed and
stabilized frames, norms, and formal rules (regarding adaptive governance) remain in
place over a prolonged period. For example, a particular type of ﬂexible contract is not
used for two or three years only, but continues to be applied over a decade or more; or
a certain new norm about operating ﬂexibly is upheld in the long term.
Enduring change in the material realm occurs when an adaptive approach to material
objects is not merely something short-lived. For example, a square continues to function
ﬂexibly as an event ground, a garden, or a parking zone over a long period of time.
The conceptual framework used in this paper is depicted in Figure 1 and summar-
ized in Table 1.
Research methodology
Research strategy and sampling
This study takes a qualitative research approach, conducted through a single, in-depth
case study. A qualitative approach was chosen because: (1) it ﬁts the qualitative nature
of the research question: we study how institutionalization and materialization trans-
form the social and the material, rather than magnitudes or frequencies of processes
Figure 1. Conceptual model.
Table 1. Overview of theoretical framework.
Main characteristics
Adaptive governance Flexible process, ﬂexible content, organizational ﬂexibility
Institutionalization of adaptive
governance
Formation and stabilization of ﬂexible institutions
Materialization of adaptive
governance
Formation and stabilization of ﬂexible materials
Transformational eﬀect: depth
of change
Deeply changed institutions: altered values, altered arena rules (arena rules
more adaptive)




Institutions have travelled into multiple organizations and places
Material objects or particular functions of objects are reproduced
elsewhere (in other organizations and places)
Transformational eﬀect:
endurance over time
Long-term change in frames, norms, regulatory arrangements
Long-term change in type and/or function of materials
6 J. ESHUIS AND L. GERRITS
(e.g. Mahoney and Goertz 2006); (2) there are no uncontested quantitative measures
for transformation, materialization, and institutionalization that could be used (e.g.
Baldwin, Chen, and Cole 2018). Therefore, research on the exact operation of these
mechanisms requires a qualitative, in-depth case analysis (Denzin and Lincoln 1994;
Levy 2008). We deliberately chose a single case study, although this precludes com-
parative analysis. It allowed us to follow the case for an extended time; this was
germane, as the study is on how institutionalization and materialization endure over
time. The prolonged time period proved crucial for understanding the transforma-
tional impact of adaptive governance. The single case also enables a more in-depth
study than multiple cases would have done. This was important given the wide scope of
our concepts and the complexity of the processes studied.
Given the theoretical considerations, strategic sampling (Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 1984)
was considered appropriate. The case should be a clear instance of adaptive governance
that was intended to have a lasting impact, should cover an extended period of time,
and should be accessible to the researchers for a prolonged period of time.
Consequently, we selected the ZoHo regeneration programme in Rotterdam, the
Netherlands. Spatially, it is conﬁned to the Zomerhof District (hence, ZoHo). Key
actors explicitly embraced a ﬂexible way of governing and considered this a norm.
Temporary use and repurposing of buildings and public spaces became observable
over time as the initiative started to create impact. Therefore, the case ﬁts the char-
acteristics deﬁned above. The circumstances for adaptive governance becoming trans-
formational were good in this case (committed key actors and failing classic,
hierarchical governance). This case can be considered a critical case (Yin 1984),
implying that, if adaptive governance does not become transformational here, it will
probably not become transformational elsewhere either (compare Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin
1984). The case selection was also partly guided by a convenience argument; we wanted
a case relatively close to the university so that we could gather data easily and
repetitively. Therefore, we only considered cases in Rotterdam and ignored options
outside the city.
Research methods
We collected data from 2013 (when the ﬁrst initiative started) to 2019 (when ZoHo was
formally tendered for redevelopment). Data were collected from various sources.
Firstly, we conducted over 100 conversations with all key actors involved with ZoHo.
These conversations – not interviews – varied from a quick chat to structured focus
groups. We also conducted seven semi-structured in-depth interviews with the main
stakeholders in the area. Secondly, we conducted participatory observations. Early on,
we negotiated access to the site as an academic partner. This allowed us to be frequently
on-site, with one of us working from an oﬃce in the area once a week for a six-month
period. We also joined approximately 30 of the many formal and informal meetings,
ranging from formal strategic discussions to community-building activities. We took
notes of the discussions andmeetings and kept a diary. In addition, we included written
records such as policy papers, spatial plans, expert reports, newsletters, and various
internet-based communications to which we had access (e.g. Facebook site, LinkedIn
site). Being present and involved helped in establishing lasting relationships with the
actors in the case. This increased their openness and thus the quality and quantity of
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data obtained. It also enabled triangulation of what interviewees said during interviews
and what they did at meetings and events.
We reconstructed a timeline as the case evolved (Figure 2). Those events that were
relevant in light of the theoretical framework were then further detailed using data
from all sources.
Several measures were taken to ensure research validity in the face of possible bias
arising from participatory observations: we involved two researchers who could correct
each other’s potential biases, alternated periods of relatively high involvement in the
area with periods of disengagement, and gathered data from diﬀerent sources includ-
ing stakeholders with diﬀerent perspectives and reports from various actors to prevent
a one-sided view.
Case study: restructuring the Zomerhof area
First follows an introduction to the area and the policy context. We then describe how
adaptive governance developed over time in two main phases, namely ‘upsurge of
adaptive governance’ and ‘decline of adaptive governance’ (see Figure 2). The last
empirical subsection analyses whether the institutionalization and materialization of
adaptive governance was transformational.
ZoHo
The Zomerhof area is a neighbourhood in Rotterdam, located right next to the city
centre. It features a mixture of housing and commercial property in the shape of oﬃces
and units for light industry. A large chunk of the housing is social housing, about 90% of
which is owned by one housing association called Havensteder. The commercial prop-
erty dates mostly from the 1950s. The buildings were well-maintained but were never
modernized and had become technically obsolete and aesthetically outdated. Until 2013,
when adaptive governance was introduced in the area, the area looked decidedly
unattractive, with hardly any pleasant public spaces and closed facades at street level.
The oﬃces and light manufacturing industry created some activity during the day, but
Figure 2. Timeline of the evolution of ZoHo with the main events and phases highlighted.
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the area appeared desolate after sunset. Rents were relatively low because of the lack of
modernization and the unattractiveness of buildings and public spaces.
In 2013, there was consensus among the actors that the buildings needed to be
either renovated or replaced. These buildings were mostly owned by Havensteder,
which had acquired them in order to redevelop them. Havensteder had a direct
interest in improving the area because of what it considered to be its social duty
and because improvement would add value to its property holdings. However, this
plan never took oﬀ because of the economic and ﬁnancial crisis that caused
a collapse of the housing and the commercial property market. Consequently, the
ﬁnancial position of Havensteder and of the prospective buyers of its holdings took
a severe hit. Havensteder could no longer aﬀord to execute its restructuring plans,
and no other party was able or willing to buy the planned new properties from
Havensteder. Consequently, it was left with a derelict urban area.
Policy context
Local government made drastic cutbacks after 2008. This also impacted the possibi-
lities in the Zomerhof area because the authorities were unable and unwilling to invest
in the area. In its search for alternatives, the local government tried to stimulate
initiatives by private parties and citizens. The municipality assumed a facilitative
role, not least because of its lack of resources. Nonetheless, the local government
had, and has, signiﬁcant competences and authority: it draws up spatial zoning
plans, and it is responsible for local infrastructure and public spaces. From 2016, in
tandem with the economic recovery, the municipality’s ﬁnancial position had started
to improve and there was some more room for investment. However, this had not yet
led to large municipal investments in the area.
At national level, the Dutch Minister of Housing introduced a policy that
severely restricted the competences of housing associations, which were forced
to abandon commercial activities and to focus on social housing. What is con-
sidered social housing was deﬁned more strictly than before. Commercial proper-
ties had to be sold oﬀ. The direct implication for the Zomerhof area was that
Havensteder could not even develop the commercial property that it had acquired
at the beginning of the crisis. Plans were made to sell the property through
a tendering procedure.
Phase I: The upsurge of adaptive governance (2012–2015)
When it became clear in 2012 that large-scale restructuring was not possible,
Havensteder decided to renovate the buildings one by one, together with other
parties and the tenants. One tenant that took an important role was STIPO,
consultants in spatial development and place-making. In 2013, the parties
involved started a process of adaptive governance or place-making through slow
urbanism, as the actors in the ﬁeld called it that time. Below, we describe how
adaptive governance materialized and institutionalized during Phase 1. We discuss
(a) materialization and (b) institutionalization of adaptive coordination, adaptive
use of rules, adaptive planning, and experimenting.
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(a) Materialization of adaptive governance
From 2013 onwards, the adaptive way of working materialized in a large number of
small-scale initiatives. There were many temporary materializations in public spaces
and buildings during numerous smaller events. There were temporary stages, ﬂags, and
other decorations, temporary greenery, bars, exhibitions, and pop-up shops. One actor
spoke of an ‘acupunctural approach’ to emphasize that material change had occurred
in many small locations. Multiple oﬃces in buildings were used ﬂexibly, especially in
the ﬁrst years after 2013 when oﬃce space could be used by anyone for any purpose,
and even be turned into a cinema or exhibition space. Thus, the function of the oﬃces
was ﬂexible and adapted to users’ needs. Another development was the materialization
of a vegan restaurant in a railway carriage on a plot that was actually designated for
other activities. The owner of the restaurant also turned the vacant area in front of this
restaurant into a herb and vegetable garden. The plot owner, Havensteder, allowed
this, because it made the plot and its direct surroundings more pleasant at no cost to
Havensteder. A club for 3D printing materialized in a garage box. During the ﬁrst year,
the printing club did not fully meet the national ﬁre-safety requirements. However, the
public oﬃcial involved used his common sense and saw that the rule did not really ﬁt
the situation anyway, that nothing dangerous could happen, and then informally
allowed temporary exemption from the rules. Later on, the printing club made the
necessary changes and continues to exist today. Other materializations that were made
possible through the adaptive way of working included a pop-up cinema in one of the
oﬃces (formally cinemas are not allowed in oﬃces) and a hostel located in an
abandoned school building. Here also, initially not all existing regulations were met
entirely, and full compliance was achieved only later on. Finally, some parking spaces
were turned into a pocket park. No formal permissions were requested, although this
would have been a formal requirement because there are strict rules about the number
of parking spaces in relationship to the number of oﬃces and houses. The pocket park
was simply ‘done’ by a few actors, but its construction was informally aligned with
relevant individuals in the municipality. The pocket park was meant to contribute to
‘unpaving’ the area and making it more climate-change-proof. The idea was to create
this initiative ﬁrst on a small scale, to entice others to do the same and enlarge it.
Interestingly, initially informal arrangements to maintain the park did not work well
and the place looked unattractive. However, the pocket park succeeded in gaining
wider attention within the municipality, and the municipality acquired an EU subsidy
to turn this into a site for climate adaptation. Thus, the bureaucracy responded and
used its resources to improve the park. During Phase II (the decline of adaptive
governance, see below), the small enticing experiment developed and materialized
into a larger park that was more permanent and less ﬂexible in use. A large ‘ZoHo’ sign
was erected, thereby signifying to passers-by that they were entering the ZoHo area.
A ‘ZoHo Vision’ materialized in 2015, in the shape of a large map on A0
posters. The vision was not only a material object in itself, but especially a step in
bringing slow urbanism closer to materialization. The map represented and
acknowledged certain material developments and positioned the development as
an objective (mapped) truth that existed independent of experience. STIPO also
published materials (books and so forth) featuring slow urbanism in the
Zomerhof area. As part of those books, ZoHo became objectiﬁed and gained
authority as a valid and appraised way of working.
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(b) Institutionalization of adaptive and horizontal coordination
During this phase, decision-making processes about the regeneration were characterized
by informal horizontal coordination and mutual alignment among stakeholders, rather
than local government hierarchically taking the decisions. Local government set the
boundaries through existing rules and regulations, but it played aminor role in the actual
regeneration of the area, whereas private parties (tenants) and Havensteder had promi-
nent roles. Instead of trying to hierarchically dictate what others should do, actors tried to
entice and enrol one another in initiatives. Enticement and appeal were more prevalent
than hierarchical command and control. Coordination among the three main players
took place through intensive informal communication, with few ﬁxed procedures or
arrangements. It was the same for the coordination of activities among entrepreneurs in
the area. Consequently, decision making was fairly ﬂexible.
New initiatives and actions were coordinated by a core group of three representa-
tives of STIPO, Havensteder, and the municipality. They met weekly and discussed
ideas and plans on a level basis. The representatives were called area coordinators or
area managers within their organization, at the level of policy advisors. Hierarchically,
they were positioned just below middle management. Although they had signiﬁcant
discretion, they needed permission from managers higher up the ranks for bigger
decisions. Thus, although horizontal coordination between actors played an important
role, it took place within a wider hierarchical context of a classic Public Administration
model (see Hughes 2003; Osborne 2006).
Between 2013 and 2015, working horizontally and on an informal basis evolved into
a normative institution; it became the norm among the three main actors. This phase
was characterized by the institutionalization of a ﬂexible use of rules and policies. This
approach was encoded in an important policy document for the area that was accepted
in 2013. The actors drew on that document to defend their way of working against the
formalized approach within the municipality. The formal policy and informal norm to
use rules ﬂexibly was enacted regularly. As a respondent explains:
At that time, we made area agreements with Havensteder, the municipality, and the borough.
Just 10 pages, as a manner of speaking, in which one sentence is the most important one: that
Havensteder and the municipality will make maximum eﬀorts to exploit room for manoeuvre in
rules. That is the sentence with which we do it. That has been put down, and in the ﬁrst instance it
was at the political level, the borough’s governor, who emphasized it. At that level, it was said: this
has been laid down and the aim is that you [respondent] are going to use this. That I will exploit
it. That I go and tell my colleagues: at a political level, it has been agreed that in this area we must
search for what is possible. So that is a fun moment, to go and apply that . . . and Havensteder:
same. John [the area manager from Havensteder, not his real name] immediately started calling
about ﬂexible tenancy contracts.
Through this formal area agreement, adaptive governance became a regulative institu-
tion. However, the regulatory institutionalization was limited because the adaptive way
of working was not reﬂected in other formal rules and regulations. Moreover, ZoHo
was informally framed as a pilot or special area for experimentation with alternative
governance methods. This was important for the municipality as an opt-out clause.
Framing it as a pilot allowed the municipality to keep adaptive ways of working limited
to the Zomerhof area with no further obligation to use them elsewhere.
That the ﬂexible application of rules was not only a norm but also formally
institutionalized conﬁrmed to the actors that this was not just the ‘way we do things
here’, but also that it was in accordance with what the municipality would allow.
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Subsequently, an adaptive form of planning institutionalized between 2013 and
2015. Actors utilized emerging opportunities instead of relying on predeﬁned and
detailed plans. This was achieved through close monitoring of current developments
within the area and its wider environment, thus looking for opportunities to further
develop the area. If such initiatives were recognized, the three main actors tried to
facilitate and strengthen these immediately; for example, when a creative entrepre-
neur was looking for working space or when somebody was looking for a place to
open a restaurant.
The ZoHo Vision plan drawn up by STIPO in interaction with other tenants,
Havensteder, and the municipality was important. This plan, completed Q3 2015,
allowed for adaptive planning, because it did not specify detailed procedures or
goals but merely sketched a broad vision and several more or less concrete ideas for
the future that could stimulate further development ﬂexibly.
Another adaptive arrangement worth mentioning here is the ‘enticing experiment’.
These were small interventions, usually material ones within buildings or in public
spaces, in which something new was tried out on a small scale. The idea was that actors
who were enthusiastic about a particular idea started by ‘just doing it’ on a small scale,
with the aim of showing that it could be done and to entice others to do so.
In addition to enticing experiments, innovations were realized adaptively by
creating temporary changes and then trying to make them permanent. For
example, actors changed part of an oﬃce building into a temporary cinema,
parking areas into a small temporary park, an empty oﬃce into the 3D printing
club, and another empty oﬃce into a temporary café and exhibition space. Many
of these temporary changes were not allowed formally. However, framing
a change as temporary meant that the municipality did not block that change.
The extent to which changes were actually temporary was left undiscussed. They
often became more permanent than the framing suggested. A similar and bold
move was the conversion of an abandoned school into a hostel without meeting
all the rules and regulations. Instead of ﬁrst trying to settle everything completely
and make sure that every rule was met, actors informally aligned their ideas and
plans with the municipality and then started when they felt that the crucial rules
had been met and that the rules that were not met yet could soon be met and
were of limited importance.
Overall, during this phase, the adaptive way of coordinating and planning and
the ﬂexible use of rules evolved into a normative institution: it became
a commonly accepted norm for almost all actors working in the Zomerhof area
and developed into a routine for the three core actors. Adaptive governance
became a cognitive institution as a broadly accepted way of thinking and framing
governance within the Zomerhof area. The frames and norms regarding slow
urbanism were also adopted and institutionalized in the ZoHo Vision. Seizing
emerging opportunities, small-scale experimentation, and starting with temporary
(material) changes became a cognitive institution, and a normative institution for
the three core actors, for whom it became a shared attitude, a pattern of thinking,
and a social norm. These ways of thinking also evolved into behavioural patterns.
However, the behavioural patterns relied heavily on the room and ability to
improvise and were not standardized in oﬃcial procedures, and this later proved
to limit the endurance of this way of working.
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Phase II. The decline of adaptive governance and the return of classic public
administration (2015–2018)
In 2015, several actors at higher echelons within themunicipality andHavensteder pleaded
for more traditional planning and governance in ZoHo. They had little interest in the
adaptive practices of slow urbanism. This declining interest was driven by the recovering
economy that freedmore resources for larger plans and investments and by signs ofmarket
interest. The housing market boomed, and the ﬁnancial position of Havensteder and other
parties in real estate improved. The municipality’s ﬁnancial position also improved as
a result of higher revenues from income tax and lower social welfare costs. In addition, the
positive developments in the ZoHo area had drawn the attention of developers and
investors; the area was increasingly seen as an attractive area for large investments.
Regardless of what was achieved, Havensteder simply needed to sell its commercial
property because ZoHo had not solved the problem of Havensteder owning commercial
real estate –whichwas against the new law.WithinHavensteder, seniormanagers expected
that, in the improving market, a large-scale sale of its commercial property would result in
higher revenues than selling the buildings one by one ﬂexibly when the opportunity arose.
Others, especially the actors working in the area on a day-to-day basis (including the area
managersmentioned above), argued for the continuation of the adaptive approach. During
this phase, therewas a clash of visions onhow to govern ongoing restructuring.Gradually, it
became less adaptive and more hierarchical. One respondent comments:
This was also the moment that the formal parties [municipality and Havensteder] grabbed the
initiative. Our position as tenants became less important.
Below, we describe the aspects of (a) (de)materialization and (b) (de)institutionalization of
adaptive governance during this phase.
(a) (de)materialization of adaptive governance
As of 2015, the use of oﬃces became less ﬂexible because many tenants wanted stable
tenancies and wanted to invest and shape the oﬃces according to their needs.
Consequently, the ﬂexible cinema and exhibition space were closed between 2015 and
2018. The oﬃces in several buildings were upgraded and their use stabilized in the long
term. The 3D printing club achieved a permanent presence. The space near the vegan
restaurant became a permanent garden instead of a multi-purpose space. The climate
adaptation park that had started as a small and ﬂexible experiment became a permanent
material structure. Thus, the usage of the buildings and public spaces stabilized over time.
The ﬂexible use of the built environment became limited to special events, i.e. conﬁned to
speciﬁc and short episodes in time after which the normal use was restored immediately.
(b) (de)institutionalization of adaptive governance
During this period, plans were prepared for the future of ZoHo within the pillars
of the municipality and Havensteder. Important decisions were now taken mostly
within the hierarchies of the two largest organizations. As one actor outside
Havensteder and the municipality explains:
The higher management . . . they meddled more strongly. Three directors, the general director, the
area director, and the real estate director . . . Two years ago, there was a monthly meeting for
external alignment about ZoHo at the level of middle management, of which I was also part. But
that ended one and a half years ago. They continued the meeting internally.
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Havensteder ended the contract with STIPO for coordinating and initiating activities
in the informal, ﬂexible way, and this was a blow to this way of working. STIPO became
less active, and coordination by the group of three informal leaders gradually became
less inﬂuential. Havensteder in the meanwhile reconsidered its position and the slow
urbanism approach. This reconsideration signalled that the adaptive way of working
was no longer considered ‘the natural order of things’, i.e. adaptive governance was de-
naturalized.
Meanwhile, in 2016, a collective of entrepreneurs in the area started a group
‘ZoHo citizens’ with the aim of continuing to develop ZoHo from the bottom up.
Although slow urbanism was not an explicit goal of ZoHo citizens, they adopted
an open attitude to bottom-up initiatives and adaptive ways of working. For
Havensteder and the municipality, ZoHo citizens was a stakeholder in the govern-
ance process that they led, and the citizen group wanted the process to become
more planned and formal, and hence less adaptive, than before.
During this phase, the use of rules generally became less ﬂexible; this can be seen
as the destabilization of adaptive rules. Firstly, the national government no longer
allowed Havensteder to own and rent out commercial property. The ministry
started to enact the law on housing associations and social housing strictly. This
pushed Havensteder towards selling its property soon and as a complete package.
The municipality started to follow existing formal procedures when working on
ZoHo, instead of working on ZoHo ﬂexibly and informally. As a respondent
explains:
Ongoing practice was to work outside the books. Urban developers were asked to ‘just make
a small sketch’ or to ‘just assess a small proposal’. But normally, we have to account for every hour
worked. What happened is that many work hours were not attributed to ZoHo because ZoHo did
not exist as a project . . . So, without cover, without a project number. Simply put, my arrival
caused it to gain a more formal status within the municipality.
The norm of planning adaptively came under pressure and de-institutionalized during
this phase, at least in themunicipality. Themunicipality wanted a formal zoning plan and
a formal urban development plan. As of 2017, Havensteder prepared a formal tender for
the redevelopment of the entire property. In accordance with national and EU tendering
laws, they needed to follow strict, pre-deﬁned procedures.
Overall, the adaptive way of coordinating and planning and the ﬂexible use of rules
were largely replaced as normative institutions during this phase. Hierarchical proce-
dures and classic planning regained importance as regulative institutions.
The rise and fall of adaptive governance
In earlier sections, the initiation of ZoHo is described as an experiment in
adaptive governance, showing how actors tried to institutionalize and materialize
their new ways of working, the extent to which this was successful, and, ulti-
mately, how both institutionalization and materialization came to a standstill. We
now discuss how the potential transformational power of adaptive governance
played out.
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Transformational change: did institutions change widely?
During the ﬁrst phase, the adaptive way of working spread among both public and
private actors within the area. However, the municipality and Havensteder did not
apply it further in other projects or areas. Middle management and top management of
neither actor embraced adaptive governance as a ﬁtting approach for dealing with
other areas, partly because it was not part of their routines, and partly because it sat
uneasily with existing procedures and rules. Therefore, the approach did not travel or
transform local governance at large. One counterforce came in the shape of a decision
by the national Ministry of Housing with regard to what housing associations are
allowed to do. In particular, the ministry made it clear that ZoHo would not be
exempted from its strict rules.
The ZoHo area was visited by numerous oﬃcials from other municipalities, min-
istries, and housing associations. They joined guided tours, workshops, and informa-
tion meetings to see how things were done. The area also welcomed international
visitors, such as Danish and Italian civil servants, as well as several academics from
Germany, for example. The municipality proudly presented ZoHo as an experimental
area for adaptive governance. Likewise, Havensteder and STIPO used it as a showcase
for their strategies. However, the interviews do not give reason to believe that these
visits, inspirational though they may have been, resulted in transformed frames or
regulatory changes.
One element of the approach in ZoHo that seems to have travelled more easily
concerns the usage of enticing experiments. A few similar experiments have been
initiated elsewhere in Rotterdam. Experiments can travel more easily because they can
be implemented fairly quickly, can be adapted to the local situation, and appear
harmless as they do not really challenge the status quo because of the limitations
imposed on them.
Although neither the municipality nor Havensteder managed to adopt the govern-
ance approach more widely, STIPO started to apply the approach regularly (for
example in two other Dutch cities, Dordrecht and Nieuwegein). As a consultant for
urban development projects, it uses elsewhere its experience obtained through ZoHo.
Therefore, it transfers the frames and informal norms and rules (although not the
formal policy) to other places and enrols other actors there in this way of working.
Transformational change: did institutions change fundamentally?
The cognitive and normative institutions changed thoroughly among the actors closely
involved in the area. They saw adaptive governance and their new way of working as
a response to a deep-seated problem in traditional, hierarchical, and government-
driven urban restructuring. Thus, their frames and routines changed not only super-
ﬁcially, but also in terms of underlying frames and norms.
Many other actors, especially the middle management and top management of
Havensteder and the municipality, cognitively framed adaptive governance more
pragmatically as a suitable approach in times of economic crisis. They saw slow
urbanism as a viable solution in weak market conditions. They therefore accepted
the frame (cognitive institution) of adaptive governance, but they did not embrace it as
a general norm (normative institution), nor did they change underlying frames, norms,
or regulations for governance or urban restructuring. The core actors enacted the
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adaptive way of working in a routine manner, but they could not make their organiza-
tions perform adaptively, despite targeted eﬀorts.
Transformational change: did adaptive institutions endure?
Adaptive governance was the main form of governance in the Zomerhof area between
2013 and 2016 (ﬁrst phase). During the second phase, the municipality and
Havensteder returned to a more classical way of steering, as dominated by the rule
of law, formal procedures, hierarchy, and top-down control. Informal interactions
continued to play a role, and ﬂexibility is still seen as a norm among some of the actors,
but these are more strongly embedded within (and restricted by) formal planning
procedures and hierarchical accountability mechanisms.
Transformational change: did material adaptiveness travel widely?
The more ﬂexible use of buildings in the Zomerhof area did not materialize widely in
other parts of Rotterdam. Nor did it materialize elsewhere in the Netherlands – at least
not as a consequence of what happened in ZoHo. Neither were, for example, parking
zones used ﬂexibly as parks elsewhere. Pop-up shops did materialize elsewhere, but this
phenomenon should be attributed to a wider trend and not to what happened in ZoHo.
An important reason why the materialization of adaptive governance did not travel
much to other areas was that ZoHo was deliberately designated as a special zone, a pilot
where things could be tried out that were not possible in other areas. Therefore, the
adaptiveness of the material dimension was eﬀectively contained.
Transformational change: was material adaptiveness fundamental?
Only in a few spots and during speciﬁc episodes did the function of material objects
become radically ﬂexible. During festivals and other events, some spots, roads, or roofs
continued to be used ﬂexibly in unconventional ways. As mentioned above, the
function of buildings was rather ﬂexible in the early years but soon people started to
make things more permanent. Few material objects maintained a radically ﬂexible
ontology in the sense that they could be ﬂexibly built up or dismantled. Exceptions
were the cinema and some exhibitions that were regularly dismantled and built up
again. However, the aim of temporary materializations was mostly to make their
existence more permanent, and, as a consequence, the material objects and their
usage also became less ﬂexible.
Transformational change: did material adaptiveness endure?
The answer to this question is manifold, even ambiguous. Adaptive governance
allowed for ﬂexible practices and the materialization of multiple objects that would
not have been possible under classic governance approaches. The ﬂexible use of rules
and the capacity to react ﬂexibly to emerging opportunities were necessary conditions
for the materialization of the hostel, the printing club, and the vegan restaurant. Several
of the objects that materialized in this way have endured, for example the vegan
restaurant. However, those material objects have now become immobile and semi-
permanent, thus losing their ﬂexible nature. Thus, one could argue that the genuinely
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ﬂexible nature of material objects did not endure beyond the ﬁrst three years when
actual experimentation took place. Later, it was merely during temporary events that
material objects were used in ﬂexible ways, for example roofs that were turned into
open-air cinemas or festival grounds.
Conclusion and discussion
This study set out to analyse the transformational eﬀects of adaptive governance on the
governance system and the built environment. The study shows how the introduction
of adaptive governance in the ZoHo case induced institutional and material changes.
However, these changes did not endure, as they were neither fundamental nor wide.
There was a momentum for institutions and materials to change, but the main actors
returned to their routines of traditional public administration dominated by hierarchy
and the rule of law once the ﬁnancial pressure decreased and their dependence on
bottom-up adaptive governance diminished. Thus, adaptive governance had a limited
transformational eﬀect. It institutionalized primarily as cognitive frames (cognitive
institutions), but also as social norms and routines (normative institutions) and
a policy (regulatory institution). However, the cognitive institutionalization was fun-
damental only among a few closely involved actors who radically embraced the idea of
adaptive governance. Other actors, notably those higher in the hierarchies of the
governance system, changed their frames only pragmatically and temporarily. Wider
institutionalization of adaptive governance was prevented by framing it as a pilot,
thereby removing its urgency and necessity. Thus, although the adaptive governance
frame itself was often accepted, the acceptance did not alter the fundamental under-
standing of how the city should be governed. Because adaptive governance did not
become a general normative institution within the municipality’s bureaucracy, it did
not institutionalize into general regulation either.
Two main conclusions are drawn regarding institutionalization: (1) adaptive gov-
ernance may institutionalize quickly at a cognitive level (i.e. framing adaptive govern-
ance as a valid way of working). However, when the frame change is superﬁcial and
underlying ideas regarding governance remain unchanged, the altered frames will de-
institutionalize. Consequently, the institutionalization will be neither enduring nor
transformational. (2) When adaptive governance institutionalizes solely as a pilot, it
does not spread and institutionalize into general norms and regulations in
government.
In terms of materialization, the study shows that adaptive governance can have
signiﬁcant material eﬀects in an area because it enables ﬂexible and temporary
solutions that are diﬃcult to realize in a traditional approach dominated by planning
rules and formal decision making. Consequently, two main conclusions are drawn
regarding materialization: (3) the use of temporary materializations and limited
experiments, which may then later materialize further, is an important but not
suﬃcient factor in the overall materialization of adaptive governance; (4) materiali-
zations that are ﬂexible in space (mobile) and time (temporary) become more solid
and inﬂexible over time, when actors invest in an area and start striving for
continuity.
Materialization and institutionalization are mutually intertwined and sometimes
diﬃcult to separate. Materialization can be enhanced or hindered by regulatory
arrangements. Institutionalization of a policy can be furthered when the policy
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becomes manifest in material infrastructure such as roads or bridges, because the
actual objects can create a lock-in, especially when they have been capital intensive.
This study addressed the question of whether adaptive governance can institutio-
nalize and materialize while keeping its core features. On the basis of the ﬁndings, the
answer is twofold: on the one hand, adaptive governance can institutionalize and
materialize in ﬂexible institutions (cognitive, normative, and regulatory) and materials
(oﬃces, shops, restaurants, parks). On the other hand, the resilience of incumbent
institutions against adaptive governance means that the emergent adaptive institutions
and materials lose their core features over time. The common argument can be made
that existing institutions run on power and a particular power distribution that is
maintained by those who beneﬁt from these. Adaptive governance has some diﬃculties
in countering the hierarchical power of the government, as do other governance
approaches that emphasize horizontal interactions and tend to downplay or ignore
(governmental) power structures (see Pierre and Peters 2000; Milward et al. 2016).
Regardless of experiments with governance, power remains real and closely tied
to the prevailing institutional setting (March and Olsen 1996). In this case study,
power and hierarchy reveal themselves in, for example, the arena rule whereby
ﬂexibility was allowed but restricted to the Zomerhof area, a rule set by the
bureaucracy and to be revoked at all times by the same bureaucracy, and only
by them. Although this allowed for experimentation, it is a simultaneous expres-
sion of the existing power structure. Consequently, the research shows that it
takes fundamental changes in ideas about governance, and the spreading of
ﬂexible governing arrangements and materials, before adaptive governance
becomes transformational. Some authors have suggested that institutionalized
learning could be helpful (e.g. Hatﬁeld-Dodds, Nelson, and Cook 2007; Ison,
Collins, and Wallis 2015), but the current research provides no observations
with regard to that aspect.
The case highlights tensions between adaptive governance and large public
organizations that work through the Weberian principles of bureaucracy. The
policy implication seems to be that adaptive governance is possible when
acknowledged as a policy exception. It is then relevant to continuously designate
spaces where the organization allows adaptive governance in order to facilitate
speciﬁc developments, rather than try to transform the entire bureaucracy into an
adaptive institution.
As a ﬁnal note, this study emphasizes the importance of studying governance
processes over a longer timespan that extends beyond the end of a project or
policy. This (ongoing) case study has so far extended over almost six years. It is
common practice in studies on governance and public administration to collect
data about a project during its running time without considering the conse-
quences (or lack thereof) in the medium to long term. The subsequent conclu-
sions can therefore be considered myopic because they are conﬁned to the
boundaries deﬁned by the project. This study continued after adaptive governance
was at its height in the case. Our preliminary conclusions regarding the impact of
adaptive governance were optimistic (in Phase I), but our assessment changed as
time went by and the initial impact petered out (in Phase II). This shows that
governance processes and their eﬀects are stretched out over long timespans.
Logically, this should be reﬂected in research designs, especially in more long-
itudinal designs.
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Note
1. The literature often focuses on the ﬂexibility or adaptive capacity of governance systems,
studying how governance systems can or cannot adapt to changing environments (e.g.
Gupta et al. 2010). An exception is Brunner (2010), who addresses transformational eﬀects
of adaptive governance. He studies adaptive governance as a strategy for reform in three public
policies.
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